Jean-Luc Picard’s consistent defense of Data’s “humanity” is centered around a materialist perspective, claiming that the mind and body are wholly incorporative within the person. ¹ Because Picard holds that “the human brain is a self-operating computer,”² Data’s brain logically fits this philosophical paradigm. He is thus regarded as an autonomous person, regardless of his synthetic composition. Picard asserts that humans, like Data, “too are machines, just machines of a different type.”³ Ting Guo has similarly observed, “In order to design and build intelligent entities like ‘us’ (Homo sapiens), ‘we’ must first be treated not as emotionally embodied ‘superior’ beings, but rather, as mechanical beings, so that we may be studied and modelled.”⁴ This perspective, however, generates a significant philosophical problem. Without a true mental state, decisions and actions in beings like Data are simply outcomes of a programmed system connected to probabilistic scenarios. Even though humans may also operate within certain variables, the crucial distinction remains: humans possess a mental life shaped by reason, emotion, and volition, whereas robots are bound to pre-determined, rational, and non-emotive processes.
Captain Bruce Maddox, on the other hand, demonstrates a dualist position, maintaining that mind and body are distinct yet interrelated, and that “human beings have both physical properties and mental properties.”⁵ Biblically speaking, this dualist anthropology is the most consistent with the doctrine of creation, where human beings were endowed with the imago Dei (Genesis 1:26–27). This divine image includes a disposition of free will, enabling humans to make moral decisions, though now marred by sin, and still retaining the capacity for libertarian choice. As Nancey Murphy has argued, contemporary debates on physicalism and dualism often fail to account for the unique theological assertion that human moral agency is grounded in divine endowment rather than mere emergent complexity.⁶
One day, artificial intelligence may develop to the point of genuine self-direction, and because naturalist worldviews are advancing rapidly into many civilizations—and in some cases, colliding with theistic philosophies—it is plausible that these discussions will increasingly occupy public consciousness. If naturalism is both valid and true, then whatever natural processes generate the human soul could conceivably be replicated in artificial beings. Even if soul-installation or spiritual endowment requires the miraculous act of God, one might imagine that a God who cares enough about human consciousness, freedom, and insight to imbue humans with souls might also grant personhood to a sufficiently advanced artificial entity.⁷
Maddox’s assessment of Picard’s supposed irrationality is not entirely unfounded, yet it also lacks empathy toward Picard’s philosophical commitments. While people may hold divergent metaphysical convictions, to dismiss them through ad hominem arguments is an uncharitable and ultimately weak approach to persuasion. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, authentic moral discourse depends upon recognizing the rationality internal to rival traditions rather than dismissing them as simply incoherent.⁸
Although the ruling on Data’s personhood cannot be reconciled entirely with dualist presuppositions, it must nonetheless be respected within the culture Star Trek depicts. If Data is capable of fulfilling the same duties as any other officer in Starfleet, the dualist may need to submit to the authority of this judgment, even if the tribunal does not share a dualist ontology. The Apostle Peter instructed believers under persecution to “submit yourselves for the Lord’s sake to every human authority: whether to the emperor, as the supreme authority, or to governors, who are sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to commend those who do right” (1 Peter 2:13–14 NIV). Although this calling is often difficult, praying for leaders remains a biblical imperative (1 Timothy 2:1–3). Regardless of their philosophical commitments, rulers occupy positions that—whether by divine sovereignty, cultural momentum, or collective choice—warrant respect. This is not to say that Christians should refrain from addressing injustice. Rather, distinguishing carefully between situations requiring resistance and those requiring peaceful engagement is paramount, demanding wisdom to discern whether a revolution is justified or whether dialogue may cultivate a more enduring peace.
If artificial intelligence becomes genuinely self-aware, it is essential to grapple with these ethical distinctions when establishing moral frameworks. Even if beings like Data are fundamentally sophisticated machines, any property or sentient entity deserves a measure of dignity. Does this imply that robots should be granted the same rights as humans? In some respects, yes; in others, no. From a dualist and libertarian perspective, human beings alone bear the image of God and an inherent conscious imprint. Nevertheless, such entities should be treated with a level of respect befitting their capacities and contributions to shared life. As C.S. Lewis once remarked, “There are no ordinary people. You have never talked to a mere mortal.”⁹ While he spoke of human souls, the underlying principle of dignifying sentient existence remains a helpful guidepost for future discussions of AI ethics.
Footnotes
¹ William Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Downers Grove: IVP, 1983), 70.
² Ibid., 70.
³ Synopsis, Star Trek: The Next Generation, Episode “The Measure of a Man,” script pg. 2.
⁴ Ting Guo, “Alan Turing: Artificial Intelligence as Human Self-Knowledge,” Anthropology Today 31, no. 6 (December 2015): 3.
⁵ Hasker, Metaphysics, 65.
⁶ Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 23–27.
⁷ Eric Schwitzgebel and Mara Garza, “A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39, no. 1 (September 2015): 105.
⁸ Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 9–10.
⁹ C.S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 46.
Bibliography
Guo, Ting. “Alan Turing: Artificial Intelligence as Human Self-Knowledge.” Anthropology Today 31, no. 6 (December 2015): 3–4.
Hasker, William. Metaphysics: Constructing a World View. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1983.
Lewis, C.S. The Weight of Glory. New York: HarperOne, 2001.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
Murphy, Nancey. Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Schwitzgebel, Eric, and Mara Garza. “A Defense of the Rights of Artificial Intelligences.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39, no. 1 (September 2015): 98–119.
The Holy Bible. New International Version.
Ken G. Palmer 
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